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INTRODUCTION

A remarkable consequence of medical science which enables
1
us to cryopreserve human gametes is the ability to conceive

† Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. is Professor of Law, teaching family law at
Suffolk University Law School. He is the co-author, with Maureen McBrien, of
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2006). He served as Chair of the A.B.A.
Family Law Section Committee on Assisted Reproduction and Genetics from 2004
to 2007 while the Committee was drafting the A.B.A. Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology. The author thanks research assistants Heather
Warnken and Cara Thompson.
1. Cryopreservation is a process for preserving gametes or embryos in which
the cells are dehydrated, suspended in an aqueous medium, treated with a
cyopreservant and transferred to liquid nitrogen, cooled off to minus 196 degrees,
and stored in this frozen condition for possible future use. See Michael S. Simon,
“Honey, I Froze the Kids”: Davis v. Davis and the Legal Status of Early Embryos, 23 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 131, 131 n.7 (1991). This is sometimes referred to as the “freezing” of
gametes. Id. The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology
section 102(31) uses the term “preservation” rather than cryopreservation to
account for the possibility that future research may produce other methods of
preserving embryos and gametes. A.B.A. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD.
TECH. § 102(31) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/
artmodelact.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
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children long after the parent’s death. This ability may be a
remarkable achievement of reproductive medical science, but it
also created legal problems that prior generations did not consider.
3
Human intrauterine insemination has been used for assisted
human reproduction in the United States since the mid-nineteenth
4
century. The potential for posthumous reproduction was not
realized, however, until science achieved the ability to cryopreserve
5
When the
gametes and embryos for long periods of time.
potential for preserving sperm for many years after the father’s
death was recognized fifty years ago, the possibility of rethinking
traditional concepts of parenthood and inheritance quickly
followed and gave birth to the concept of the “fertile decedent”
6
that is now familiar to students of future interests.
II. DEFINITIONS OF POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN
For purposes of this article, a posthumous child is one who is
conceived after the death of its parent. This definition does not
include a pretermitted child who was born or adopted after the
7
execution of a will. Neither will it deal with a child who is
conceived by coitus during the lifetime of its father but not born
8
A situation in which a father sexually
until after his death.
2. Although it is possible to preserve sperm and embryos for long periods of
time, the cryopreservation of unfertilized eggs for long periods has been less
successful. Debra A. Gook & David H. Edgar, Human Oocyte Cryopreservation, 13
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 591, 591–605 (2007) (noting that the science of egg
preservation shows no proper evidence of improved clinical outcome).
3. Intrauterine insemination is also sometimes called “artificial
insemination.”
4. Johnson v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 881 (2002) (referencing the
fact that the first reported use of intrauterine insemination in the United States
was in 1866).
5. For example, cryopreserved embryos may be preserved in a viable
condition for up to half a century. R. G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard, Destruction of
Cryopreserved Embryos: UK Law Dictated the Destruction of 3000 Cryopreserved Human
Embryos, 12 HUM. REPROD. 3 (1997).
6. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the
Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962).
7. The Uniform Probate Code, section 2-108 provides that a child “in
gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives
120 hours or more after birth.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (revised 1990), 8
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 2008). Thus, a child in gestation who so qualifies is the legal heir
of its parent even if that parent is dead when the child is born. See also 26B C.J.S.
Descent and Distribution § 51 (2008) (noting that a posthumous child is not
necessarily a pretermitted child).
8. By definition, a child conceived by sexual intercourse is not a child of

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/9

2

Kindregan: Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer

2009]

DEAD DADS

435

impregnates a woman during his lifetime and the child is not born
until after his death does not raise the same kinds of legal issues as
9
the use of gametes to conceive a child after a parent’s death. This
article will focus on the legal implications of the use of gametes and
embryos to conceive human children after the death of the
producer(s) of cryopreserved sperm, eggs or embryos.
Although there is a clear difference between the status of a
child conceived after a parent’s death and one conceived by the
use of the gametes of an incompetent parent who is not able to give
consent, the law treats the two situations the same. Therefore, the
10
American Bar Association Model Act on Assisted Reproduction
11
requires that, except in an emergency, gametes or embryos
should not be collected from either a deceased or an incompetent
12
person unless they gave consent in a record before death or
incompetency, or expressly authorized a fiduciary to give such
13
For that reason, any comments in this article about
consent.
consent of a deceased parent to use of his or her gametes should
also apply to an incompetent person.

assisted reproduction. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102-1.
9. The kinds of issues presented in a case involving a child allegedly
conceived by sexual intercourse before his father’s death revolve around
traditional paternity litigation, such as whether the decedent is the child’s
biological father. The general rule is that a child born after a parent’s death is not
an heir under the law of inheritance unless the child was conceived naturally, i.e.
by sexual intercourse. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.1 cmt. d (1999).
10. The American Bar Association Family Law Section approved the A.B.A.
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology in 2007, and the A.B.A.
House of Delegates approved it on February 11, 2008. See Charles P. Kindregan,
Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar Association
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203 (2008)
(discussing the history of the Act, its approval by the American Bar Association,
and the provisions of the Act).
11. The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology,
section 205(2) defines an exception in the collection of gametes or embryos as
circumstances in which, in the treating physician’s opinion, delay would cause a
loss of viability, and there is a genuine question as to the existence of a recorded
consent by the now incompetent or deceased person. MODEL ACT, supra note 1,
§ 205(2).
12. The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology,
section 102(33) defines a record as “information inscribed in a tangible medium
or stored in an electronic or other medium that is retrievable in perceivable
form.” MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102(33).
13. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 205(1).
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III. WHY IS POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION USED?
There are various circumstances in which people seek to
procreate a child using the gametes of a deceased person. In some
instances, a surviving spouse or intimate friend seeks to use the
gametes which have been specifically cryopreserved for use prior to
14
the death of the loved one. Examples include situations in which
a soldier or other person engaged in high risk activity
15
cryopreserved his or her gametes. Another example is when a
dying or seriously ill person cryopreserves gametes for use by
16
In other instances, an
specifically named potential survivors.
untimely death may create a situation in which gametes become
available even though the deceased person did not anticipate death
17
and therefore did not specifically consent before death. These
18
are the most legally troublesome cases. For example, a parent or
spouse may seek access to the sperm of a person killed in an
automobile accident or in a war, wishing to continue the genetic
19
line of the family. In another example, a husband may seek to use
14. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 840–41 (1993) (man executed a
will giving his cryopreserved sperm to his girlfriend before committing suicide).
15. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2004) (citing various newspaper reports of United States
soldiers cryopreserving their sperm before deployment); Major Maria Doucettperry, A
Look at Posthumous Reproduction as it Relates to Today’s Military, Dept. of the Army,
Pamphlet 27-50-420 (reviewing policies of the United States Army involving the
collection of gametes and their use in producing posthumous reproduction).
16. Elizabeth Gorman, Minnesota Woman Trying to Conceive Her Husband’s
Child—After His Death, MINNPOST.COM, June 24, 2008, http://www.minnpost.com/
stories/2008/06/24/2340/minnesota_woman_trying_to_conceive_her_husbands_
child_--_after_his_death (noting that husband cryopreserved his sperm for his
wife’s use before starting cancer treatment which was likely to make him infertile).
See also Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002)
(husband placed his sperm in sperm bank before his death for his wife’s use).
17. Ike Flores, Newlywed Dies in Crash, But Hopes For Children Live in Extracted
Sperm, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at A10 (recounting removal of sperm from body of
man killed in an accident); Peter Gregory, Court Lets Widow Save Husband’s Sperm,
THE SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 22, 1998, at 3 (recounting that a widow whose
husband died in an motor vehicle accident obtained court judgment to have her
husband’s sperm removed from his body).
18. See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 39 (1999) (questioning use of gametes removed from body of
deceased person).
19. Aron Heller, Family Gets OK to Use Dead Man’s Sperm, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/
01/29/international/i054346S45.DTL&feed=rss.news (family of soldier killed by a
sniper obtained an Israeli court order to use sperm removed immediately after his
death to have a child to be carried by a gestational surrogate).
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the eggs of his now incompetent wife in order to use a gestational
surrogate to gestate them. In other instances, a person may seek
access to the gametes of a family member which the deceased
person had cryopreserved for his own future use.
IV. PROPOSALS REGARDING POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
For the most part, issues relating to posthumous reproduction
20
21
have focused on inheritance issues,
Social Security issues, or
22
other benefits. The drafts of the various uniform and model acts,
however, reflect the wider importance of the topic even beyond
eligibility for benefits, and they continue to try to develop law on
the subject notwithstanding the failure of the first proposed
23
uniform law on the subject. The newest version of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2000), amended in 2002, includes a provision titled
24
“Parental Status of Deceased Individual.” This provides:
[I]f an individual who consented in a record to be a
parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of
eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a
25
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse
20. See Robert M. Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York’s Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law Should be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as
Decedent’s Issue and Descendents, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267 (2008) (discussing
problems of inheritance in determining the status of posthumously conceived
children); Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967 (1996)
(discussing inheritance problems from posthumous conception of children).
21. Compare Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257 (children posthumously conceived
using dead father’s sperm were entitled to Social Security benefits), with Khabbaz
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 2007) (posthumously conceived child
not entitled to Social Security benefits).
22. See, e.g., Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., No. CA 08-222, 2008 WL 4724076 (Ark.
App. Oct. 28, 2008) (posthumously conceived children entitled to workman’s
compensation benefits).
23. The first attempt to draft a uniform law governing assisted reproduction
was the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988). Section 4(b) of the Act provided
that a child conceived using eggs or sperm of a deceased person is not a parent of
the resulting child. Id. § 4(b). The Act was not widely adopted and was replaced
by the provisions in Articles 7 and 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) §§ 701–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 2008).
24. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55 (Supp.
2008).
25. The term “deceased spouse” in the official text of section 707 appears
inconsistent with the term “individual” in the remainder of the statute. Compare
id., with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 2008).
Prior to the 2002 amendments, the consent provision of section 707 governing
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consented in a record that if the assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would
26
be a parent of the child.
This proposed rule would clearly require express consent in
some sort of record given during the lifetime of the person whose
gametes or embryos are to be used after his or her death to
conceive a child. If such consent does not exist prior to the
placement of the gametes or embryos and the death of the person,
the law would not attribute parentage of the resulting child to the
27
deceased person. The consent requirement, however, does not
apply to a gamete donor or embryo donors because that person or
those persons did not intend to be a parent either during his or her
28
lifetime or after death.
The American Bar Association Model Act on Assisted
Reproduction in part tracks the Uniform Parentage Act consent
provisions as applied to post-mortem conception, but with several
differences. It provides:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in the enacting
jurisdiction’s probate code, if an individual who
consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm or
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a
consent by a person to post-mortem use of his or her gametes limited consent to a
“spouse,” but the 2002 amendments replaced “spouse” with “individual” except as
noted in the quotation in the text. Id. In enacting the uniform act, Texas and
Utah replaced the word “individual” with the term “spouse” throughout their
version of section 707, making clear that in those states, only a married person’s
consent has the effect of approving consent. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160 (2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (2008). Some states enacted section 707 by
eliminating the word “spouse” entirely, making clear that the provision deals with
individual consent whether the person is married or not. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 8-707 (2008).
26. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55 (Supp.
2008). See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579 (2005).
27. In the case of the placement of an embryo produced by both nowdeceased persons, it seems obvious that the consent of both of them during their
lifetimes would be required. Such mutual consent would also be required in an
inter vivos embryo transfer. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien,
Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved
Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169 (2004).
28. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 704 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 53 (Supp.
2008) (consent requirement does not apply to a donor). A donor is an individual
who produces eggs or sperm for assisted reproduction, as distinguished from an
intended parent. Id. § 102(8).
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record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
29
child.
The Model Act by its own terms is intended to defer to any
probate code provision which a state may enact dealing with
posthumous reproduction, while the uniform law contains no such
30
provision. During the drafting of the Model Act, concerns were
expressed about the potential impact on estate planning and
administration of estates when there are cryopreserved gametes
31
and embryos which at the time of death are still not placed.
While the Uniform Probate Code does not currently expressly
32
provide for children of posthumous reproduction, it is possible
that future legislation in some states may do so. The A.B.A. Model
33
Act provides for this potential development.
It will be noted that both the Uniform Parentage Act and the
A.B.A. Model Act on Assisted Reproduction refer to the consent of
34
but the Model Act contains a very broad
a deceased spouse,
definition of legal spouse. According to the Model Act, legal
29. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 607. An example of a court honoring the
intent of a deceased gamete provider is found in In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. App. 2008) in which a widow sought a court order giving her
access to her late husband’s cryopreserved sperm, which had been deposited as
part of the couple’s in vitro fertilization treatment. The parents of the deceased
man appeared and objected to release of the sperm. Id. at 312. Before his death
in an accident, the man expressed a desire not to have children, but agreed to
participate in the fertility treatment to please his wife and to avoid a divorce. Id. at
313. As part of the medical treatment, he executed a form that included an
option to dispose of his deposited sperm in the event of his death. Id. This box
was checked on the form. Id. The court ruled that his expression of intent
controlled, and that this did not implicate the widow’s procreative autonomy since
only his gametes and not hers were affected by the choice to discard the sperm.
Id. at 317–18.
30. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 607.
31. This information is personal knowledge of the author, obtained while he
served as Chair of the A.B.A. Family Law Section Committee on Reproductive and
Genetic Technologies Committee during the drafting of the Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology. To deal with this problem a provision was
added to section 607 (which deals with the parental status of a deceased
individual) which defers to any contrary provision in a state’s probate code.
32. The current version of the Uniform Probate Code does not provide either
for or against inheritance by a posthumous child and simply provides that for
purposes of intestate inheritance, an individual is the child of its natural parents
regardless of their marital status. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (revised 1990), 8
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 2008).
33. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 701–02.
34. UNIF.. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55
(Supp. 2008); MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 501-3-4.
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spouse means “an individual married to another, or who has a legal
relationship to another that this state accords rights and
responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of
35
Both the Uniform Parentage Act and the A.B.A.
marriage.”
Model Act provisions relating to posthumous reproduction are
premised on the existence of a spousal relationship, however
36
They would not,
“spouse” may be defined under state law.
therefore, be applicable to the factual situation that existed in the
famous California decision in Hecht v. Superior Court, in which a
deceased man provided in his will for his surviving girlfriend to
37
have and be able to use his cryopreserved sperm.
The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction also
restricts the collection of gametes, embryos or preserved tissue
from a deceased person unless that person executed consent in a
record prior to death, or unless that person’s authorized fiduciary
has express authorization from the deceased person to give such
38
This does not, however, solve the problem when, for
consent.
example, an emergency room physician is asked to remove sperm
or eggs from a recently deceased person and the failure to do so
promptly would result in loss of viability. For this reason, the
A.B.A. Model Act contains a provision expressly allowing the
prompt removal of the gametes when it is alleged that the deceased
person did consent in a record but the record is not then
39
Gametes removed in this emergency
immediately available.
situation, however, may not be transferred unless subsequently
35. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102-21. The Uniform Parentage Act does not
define spouse or legal spouse, and it is potentially subject to interpretation as
being restricted to traditional male-female formal marriage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(2000) § 102 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 2008).
36. Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act and section 606 of the Model
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology both require a recorded consent
to posthumous reproduction by the “deceased spouse.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(2000), § 707 (amended 2002); MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 707. The Uniform
Parentage Act does not define spouse, but § 102-21 defines a legal spouse as “an
individual married to another, or who has a legal relationship to another that this
state accords rights and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to,
those of marriage.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), § 102-21 (amended 2002). This
definition would treat partners in a legal civil union or registered domestic
partnership as being “spouses.”
37. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 860–61 (1993) (ruling that the
use of cryopreserved sperm of a deceased man to produce a child would not be
contrary to public policy).
38. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 205-1.
39. Id. § 205-2.
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approved by a court, and the absence of a record consent creates a
40
presumption that no consent was given.
V. STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE STATUS OF POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN
The status of a child that is posthumously conceived is
important for the resolution of various legal issues. The most
important of these is the question of inheritance rights of the child
under the state’s intestacy laws. This in turn becomes important in
41
the resolution of Social Security rights, discussed below, since
federal law defers to state law in the determination of the status of
the child. The question may also be important in determining the
child support obligations of the estate of the deceased parent, at
least in states in which the estate may have an obligation to pay
42
child support.
Most states have no statutes dealing expressly with posthumous
reproduction. A few states have enacted the Uniform Parentage
Act, which contains some version of Section 707 dealing with
43
children of posthumous reproduction. In some of these states—
44
45
46
Utah, and Washington —the legislation deletes the
Texas,
word “individual” at the beginning of section 707 and substitutes
the word “spouse,” making clear that those states did not wish to
legalize consent to posthumous reproduction by unmarried
40. Id. § 205-3. Failure to comply with the rules governing post-mortem
removal of gametes or embryos can result in civil or criminal liability, as provided
in law. Id. § 205-4.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (1989)
(standard for determining rights of child of Social Security beneficiary).
42. See, e.g., L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Mass. 2008) (initial order of
support for nonmarital child may be entered and made enforceable against his
estate after parent’s death).
43. As of the date this article was written Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002). A number of states have retained
the older Uniform Parentage Act (1973) rather than enacting the newer version
which was drafted years before the modern use of assisted reproduction except for
intrauterine insemination; the 1973 version is not discussed in this article since the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has replaced it
with the 2000 version as amended in 2002. Id. Oklahoma elected to omit section
707 in its enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10,
§ 7700 (West Supp. 2008).
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (Supp. 2008).
46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2008)
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persons.
The Texas statute also provides that the record
containing the consent of the deceased person must be maintained
47
48
49
by a licensed physician. Delaware and Wyoming have enacted
versions of section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act which
eliminate the word “spouse” and simply refer to “individuals” as
consenting to posthumous reproduction. Before it enacted the
50
2000 Uniform Parentage Act in 2005, North Dakota was the only
state which by statute expressly denied the parenthood of any
person whose gametes were used after his or her death, but this law
51
has been repealed. No state by statute now expressly prohibits
any recognition of posthumous reproduction for all purposes.
Some states have enacted statutes governing assisted
reproduction that specifically provide for posthumously conceived
52
enacted a statute governing assisted
children.
Colorado
reproduction which recognizes the status of a child whose gametes
were produced from a now-deceased spouse. Florida restricts
claims for inheritance by a posthumously conceived child unless
53
54
the deceased parent has provided for the child by will. Virginia
55
has enacted several statutes, but they are not entirely consistent.
A. The California Statute
The California courts were the first to struggle with the issues
created by the possibility of posthumous conception. In 1993 the
Second District California Court of Appeal was asked to decide if
an unmarried woman who had been designated by will to have
access to and right to use the sperm of her now–deceased boyfriend

47. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (Supp. 2006).
49. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2007).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (Supp. 2007) (applying section 707 to child
of deceased spouse).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-06 to -07, repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 135, § 11.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); see also Stephen v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (posthumously
conceived child is not the legal heir of father under Florida law in absence of will
so providing).
54. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-158B, -164(i) (2008).
55. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 232–
33 (2006) (noting problems and inconsistencies in application of the Virginia
statutes).
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should be allowed to receive his cryopreserved sperm. The court
had been asked by the children of the deceased man to rule that
state public policy should not approve of posthumous reproduction
since it would permit the creation of an orphaned child by artificial
57
means. A lower court had ordered the sperm destroyed, but on
58
appeal the court reversed. In a decision of first impression under
American law the court ruled that, in the absence of a statute
governing the matter, a court did not have the authority to order
the cryopreserved sperm destroyed and that no overriding public
policy would prevent the gametes from being used to create a child
after the father’s death when he specifically consented to it during
59
his lifetime.
A decade later, California enacted a statute in 2004 dealing
60
with the consequences of posthumous reproduction. This is the
most comprehensive attempt to regulate posthumous reproduction
by statute to date. The statute deemed a posthumously conceived
child to have been born during the lifetime of the parent when the
61
requirements of the statute have been met. The statute provides
for distribution of a parent’s property to the posthumously
conceived child if the parent had consented to the postmortem use
of his gametes in writing and designated a specified person to have
62
It is also required that the posthumous child be
their use.
63
conceived and exist in utero within two years of the parent’s death.
This statute recognizes the real potential for posthumous
reproduction, and solves several problems. These problems
include the need for specific consent requirements, the need for a
relative proximity of conception to the time of the parent’s death,
and the need for the estate administrator to close the estate and
make distribution in a reasonable time after the parent’s death.

56. Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
57. Id. at 288.
58. Id. at 291.
59. Id. at 288–89.
60. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 775, p. 92 (A.B. 1910) (West) (amending
various provisions in the California Codes, including the Family Code, the Health
and Safety Code, the Insurance Code and the Probate Code). The statute does
not apply to posthumous children conceived by cloning. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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B. Interpreting the Law in States That Have No Explicit Posthumous
Conception Statutes
When a state has not enacted a statute which expressly deals
with the legal status of a posthumously conceived child, the courts
will have to provide a legal interpretation based on its reading of
the generalized statutes and common law in the jurisdiction. The
most common context in which this question has arisen to date
involve Social Security claims. The claims of a posthumously
conceived child for Social Security benefits are based on the child’s
64
relationship to the deceased Social Security beneficiary. This is
dependent on the child’s status under state law; thus there have not
been consistent results in various Social Security cases around the
65
country.
Under federal law, a child is entitled to benefits if he is the
legally recognized child of a person who dies fully insured under
the Social Security law, is under the age of 18, and was dependent
on the Social Security beneficiary at the time of that person’s
66
death. In one case, a man who was dying of cancer cryopreserved
his sperm with the intent of his wife having a child after his death,
and the wife was successfully impregnated with his sperm sixteen
67
months after his death. Twins were born more than two years
after his death, and application was made for Social Security
68
The administrator of the Social Security
benefits for them.
agency declined to award benefits, and counsel for the children
69
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts. On appeal,
the U.S. District Court judge sent certified questions to the
Supreme Judicial Court of the state regarding the status of the
70
twins under state law. The Massachusetts intestacy statute did not
contain a provision requiring that a posthumous child actually be
64. Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987) (minor claiming
Social Security benefits based on status of deceased parent must have been
dependent on that parent).
65. Compare Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004)
(granting Social Society benefits), and Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760
N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (granting Social Society benefits), with Finley v. Astrue,
No. 07-627, 2008 WL 95775 (Ark. Jan. 10, 2008) (denying Social Security benefits)
and Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 2007) (denying Social
Security benefits).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2008).
67. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 260–61.
70. Id. at 261.
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in utero at the time of a parent’s death in order to qualify as an
71
heir.
The Massachusetts court responded to the certified questions
by stating that under state law it would be possible for the twins to
72
be legal heirs of the deceased father. The state court noted that
in such a case, the children would have to be the genetic children
of the deceased person and the deceased parent would have to
have consented to use of his gametes for posthumous reproduction
73
and to the support of a resulting child. The court also expressed
the need to balance the state’s interest in the orderly and prompt
74
This
administration of estates with the rights of the children.
suggests that in a future case in which a child is conceived long
75
after the parent’s death, the result could be different.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
interpreting Arizona law, also ruled that twins conceived with their
genetic father’s sperm ten months after his death were entitled to
76
The Social Security administration
Social Security benefits.
argued that since the children did not exist when the father died,
77
they were not then dependent on him for support. The court
reasoned, however, that since the children were his legitimate
78
children under state law, they were dependent on him.
In a case involving an embryo that was implanted in a widow
after the death of her husband, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
ruled that the resulting child was not the legal heir of its biological
79
The court’s decision was based on the fact that the
father.
80
statute provides for inheritance for a posthumously born child

71. Id. at 264.
72. Id. at 271–72. See also L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934 (Mass. 2008) (noting
that in Massachusetts, an estate can sometimes be held liable for child support).
73. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
74. Id. at 266–68.
75. Since death of a spouse terminates the marriage, technically a
posthumously conceived child is born out of wedlock; in Woodward, the court
noted that this did not affect the children’s right to inherit since under state law
marital and nonmarital children are entitled to be treated equally. Id. at 266–67.
However, such equal treatment with regard to the distribution of a parent’s estate
is not possible as to a child conceived after estate distribution has been made. Id.
at 267–68.
76. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id. at 599.
79. Finley v. Astrue, No. 07-627, 2008 WL 95775, at *1 (Ark. Jan. 10, 2008).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2004).
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81

only if it was conceived before the parent’s death.
Since the
embryo was implanted after the father’s death the court ruled that
82
The Supreme Court of New
the child could not inherit.
Hampshire, interpreting a statute relating to “surviving issue,”
ruled that the posthumously conceived child must be surviving at
83
the time of the father’s death in order to qualify as his heir. A
federal court interpreted a Florida statute as providing that a
posthumously conceived child is the issue of its deceased parent
84
only if he provided for the child in his will.
Based on court rulings to date it is apparent that at least for
Social Security purposes state inheritance law must either expressly
allow for posthumous conception of a child or contain language
85
which is sufficiently vague to permit such an interpretation. A
requirement in a state statute that a child be a life in being at the
time of a parent’s death would make it practically impossible to
86
find that a child conceived after a parent’s death was a legal heir.
In addition the resulting child must be genetically connected to the
deceased parent, which effectively rules out the use of donor sperm
or eggs. To the extent that legitimacy is a factor to be considered
under state law the surviving parent and the deceased parent’s
marriage becomes relevant. Even independent of Social Security
issues, the length of time which elapses between the death of the
parent and the use of that person’s gametes to conceive a child
becomes relevant, and in the future some reasonable time factor is
87
likely to evolve.
81. Finley, 2008 WL 95775, at *4.
82. Id. at *1. The court declined to define the meaning of the word
conception. Id. at *5.
83. Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007).
84. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2008) (interpreted in Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005)).
85. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004); Stephen,
386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; Finley, 2008 WL 95775, at *5; Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1184;
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
86. A Social Security claim might prevail, however, based on some
constitutional argument. In Hart v. Charter, 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1996), dismissed, the
court interpreted a Louisiana Statute as providing that a child not conceived
naturally was not in being as of the death of a parent, but when a Social Security
claimant who was conceived after the death of its parent raised constitutional
arguments the Social Security Administration agreed to pay benefits. See Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, supra note 55, at 240–41 (discussing the Hart
litigation).
87. The Restatement (Third) of Property provides that for an afterborn child
to inherit, the child would have to be born within a “reasonable time after the
decedent’s death in order not to delay distribution of the estate unduly.”
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Probate cases also provide some analysis on the issue of
posthumously conceived children. A New Jersey decision noted
that the status of a posthumous child should be determined even if
the father left no estate to be distributed in probate because it
could be relevant if other persons left property to the “children” of
the father in a will or if a child might be entitled to take from the
88
estate of the father’s relatives who die intestate.
Complications can arise when a settlor of a trust or other
testamentary gift provides for “issue” or a similar designation and
after that person’s death a child is conceived using assisted
89
For example, a New York case involved a trust
reproduction.
created in 1959 which provided for the income from the settlor’s
90
trust to go to the issue of children but excluded adopted children.
The question presented to the court involved the status of twins
conceived after the settlor’s death using his son-in-law’s sperm but a
91
donor egg and a gestational surrogate. The court ruled that the
child was a beneficiary of the trust since the settlor intended to
exclude only adopted children, not all children who were not
92
genetically related to him.
In another case involving a trust created in 1969, the question
presented was whether children conceived by in vitro fertilization
using the sperm of the grantor’s son, who died a few years before
the procedure, were “issue” or “descendants” of the grantor when
the grantor intended members of his bloodline to be beneficiaries
93
of his trust. The court reasoned that as a matter of policy the law
should consider one “born of this new biotechnology with the
94
Providing a
consent of their parents” as a natural child.
“sympathetic reading” of the trust instruments, the New York court
95
ruled that the twins were part of the grantor’s bloodline.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5, ¶ 8
(1999).
88. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2000).
89. See, e.g., In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sur. 2005).
90. Id. at 879.
91. Id. at 879–80.
92. Id. at 878. The husband and wife obtained a judgment of parentage from
a California court, and the New York court noted that a child conceived by
surrogacy in California is not governed by the adoption statute. Id. at 881.
93. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (N.Y. Sur. 2007).
94. Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 211–12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding that the reproductive technology has been
available for over half of a century, the law governing posthumously
conceived children is only starting to develop. There is no
uniformity in the governing law across the country, and from all
appearances it is unlikely that universally accepted norms will
evolve in the near future. While, as discussed in this article, various
statutory schemes have been proposed, no uniformity has been
achieved. This leaves the law in doubt, but it also leaves the legal
status of parents and children in limbo and subject to different
results in different states. There is also no reason to treat nonmarital posthumous children differently from marital children
conceived after death when the deceased parent has consented to
their posthumous conception. It is to be hoped that more
consideration will be given to these issues and will result in more
uniform legislative action in the future.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/9

16

